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U.S.-Canadian Grain Disputes
Won W. Koo* and Ihn H. Uhm**
The United States and Canada are two of the world's largest
exporters of grain-especially wheat and barley-and compete
with each other in major foreign markets.1 They share a com-
mon interest in reducing government interference in world agri-
cultural markets and encouraging freer world trade.
The Canada and U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) 2 and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 3 which in-
cludes Mexico, became effective in 1989 and 1994, respectively.
The CUSTA has been fully implemented for bilateral trade be-
tween the United States and Canada. NAFTA, when fully im-
plemented, will create the largest single market in the world, a
market of more than 350 million consumers with trade valued at
over $230 billion annually.
* Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State
University.
** Senior Economist, Canadian International Trade Tribunal. This paper
does not represent the opinions of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
1. See e.g.,INTERNATIONAL GRAINS COUNCIL, WORLD GRAIN STATISTICS
(1997/98).
2. The CUSTA created a free trade area comprised of Canada and the
United States. The objectives of the Agreement are to eliminate barriers to
trade in goods and services between the two countries; facilitate conditions of
fair competition within the free-trade area; liberalize significantly conditions
for investment within this free-trade area; establish effective procedures for the
joint administration of this Agreement and the resolution of disputes; and lay
the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to expand and
enhance the benefits of this Agreement. The CUSTA established rules of origin
for determining whether goods were "originating" and entitled to CUSTA bene-
fits. Tariffs were to have been eliminated on all goods by January 1, 1998. See
generally INT'L TRADE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1987).
3. The NAFTA created a free trade area that encompasses Canada, Mex-
ico, and the U.S. In a nutshell, the basic format of NAFTA closely follows that
of the CUSTA and a number of provisions of NAFTA have been designed to
rectify difficulties experienced under the CUSTA. See generally NAFTA:
WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?, 12-16 (External Affairs and International Trade Canada,
1993); RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., THE NAFTA, WHATs IN, WHATS OUT, WHATS
NEXT, 26-29 (C.D. Howe Institute Policy Study 21, 1994).
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Although the economies of the three NAFTA partners are
highly interdependent, the degree of interdependence has been
asymmetric. Mexico and Canada depend much more on the
United States than the reverse. Prior to the implementation of
NAFTA, 75 percent of Canadian exports and 88 percent of Mexi-
can exports were destined for the United States. However, only
22 percent of U.S. exports were shipped to Canada and 7 percent
to Mexico, mainly because of differences in economic conditions,
relative sizes of the economies, and social structures among
these countries. While the United States and Canada are simi-
lar in terms of economic conditions and social structure, Mexico
differs significantly from its trading partners. The United
States has the highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
($28.6 thousand), followed by Canada ($19.4 thousand) (see Ta-
ble 1). Per capita GDP in Mexico is about one-ninth of that in
the United States. Farm population is approximately 27 percent
of the total population in Mexico and is less than 2.5 percent in
the United States and Canada. Per capita farmland in Mexico
(0.6 acres) is smaller than the United States (1.7 acres) and Can-
ada (4.1 acres). On the other hand, the United States is about 9
times larger than Canada in terms of population and about 3
times larger than Mexico. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem 4, the effects of the free trade agreement will be larger
between the United States and Mexico mainly because of the
dissimilarity in resource endowments between these two
countries.
The agreements have increased trade volume among the
countries, especially for agricultural commodities and products
between the United States and Canada under CUSTA. The av-
erage Canadian export of wheat and barley to the United States
was larger in volume than the average U.S. exports to Canada
for the 1990-97 period (see Table 2). In addition, Canadian ex-
ports to the United States have increased faster than U.S. ex-
ports to Canada. U.S. imports of Canadian western redspring
(CWRS) wheat, for example, increased from 8.0 million bushels
1990 to over 65.7 million bushels in 1993 and then decreased to
56.7 million bushels in 1997. However, U.S. exports of HRS
wheat to Canada averaged only about 0.4 million bushels per
year during the same period. Bilateral trade of durum wheat
between the two countries was similar to that for HRS wheat.
4. See JAMEs R. MARKUSEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND Ev-
IDENCE 106 (1995) (theorem says that a country has a comparative advantage
in producing a commodity that intensely uses its relatively abundant factors).
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The import surge in 1993 led to the negotiation of a temporary
agreement to limit Canadian wheat exports to the United
States.5 U.S. barley imports from Canada also grew rapidly
from 9.9 million bushels in 1990 to nearly 89.2 million bushels
in 1994 and then decreased to 45.4 million bushels in 1997. The
imports accounted for over 10 percent of U.S. domestic consump-
tion. During the same period, U.S. barley exports to Canada
were less than 0.2 million bushels (See Table 2).
Because of rapid increases in Canadian export supply of ag-
ricultural commodities into the U.S. in the post CUSTA era,
grain producers in Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota have
sought protection through trade laws. In addition, producers in
these states have also engaged in the blockade of Canadian
grain and livestock shipments to the United States. Further-
more, South Dakota Governor Bill Janklow announced new in-
spection requirements for all trucks carrying Canadian grain
and livestock beginning at noon, September 16, 1998.6 Gover-
nors of North Dakota, Montana and Idaho followed the South
Dakota measures and announced a stepped-up effort to inspect
Canadian trucks as they cross the border into these states.7 On
December 2, 1998, in the aftermath of series of trade disputes,
the United States and Canada announced the Record of Under-
5. The agreement was effective only for one year from September 12, 1994
to September 11, 1995. See U.S. Statement Regarding Trade Between the
United States and Canada on Wheat, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE 94-
43.
6. See Governor William J. Janklow, Janklow Starts Truck Inspection of
Canadian Grain and Livestock on Wednesday at Noon, Press Release by Office
of the Governor, State of South Dakota (September 15, 1998). Trucks carrying
Canadian grain must supply proof that the grain is free of Karnal Bunt and
wild oats. In addition, the grain should be free of the following six chemicals;
dimetridazole, Ipronidazol, nitroimidazoles, fluoroquinolones, glycopeptides,
and sulfamethazine.
7. See Governor Ed Schafer, Schafer Says North Dakota Will Inspect and
Inventory All Trucks at North Dakota Weigh Stations, Press Release by Office of
the Governor, State of North Dakota (September 15, 1998); Governor Marc
Racicot, Governor Racicot Joins Midwestern Governors in Inspecting Canadian
Agricultural Trucks, Press Release by Office of the Governor, State of Montana
(September 18, 1998); Governor Phillip E. Blatt, Governor Blatt Supports Mid-
western Governors in Inspecting Canadian Agricultural Trucks, Press Release
by Office of the Governor, State of Idaho (September 18, 1998). In addition,
North Dakota proposed a law that would restrict the entry of Canadian prod-
ucts under the guise of technical requirements. The proposed new law would
prohibit a wide range of Canadian agricultural products from entering North
Dakota without the necessary scientific justification required by NAFTA and by
domestic U.S. regulations. Canadian government vigorously protested to defend
the rights of Canadian exporters agricultural goods. In this regard, Canada re-
quested NAFTA consultations on North Dakota trade barrier.
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standing in agricultural trade to ease tension between the two
countries.8
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the market
conditions conducive to trade flows and the causes of trade dis-
putes between the U.S. and Canada with respect to wheat and
barley. To this end, the interwoven dynamics of free trade
agreements, trade remedy laws in the United States, profit seek-
ing interest groups, and the geopolitical economy will be ana-
lyzed. The paper will then discuss new developments for conflict
resolution between the two trade partners. The last section pro-
vides concluding remarks.
I. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR TRADE FLOW OF
GRAINS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA
Bilateral trade flows of wheat and barley between the
United States and Canada under CUSTA are influenced by dif-
ferences in resource endowments, marketing systems, availabil-
ity of marketable surpluses, differences in crop quality, and
farm policies between the two countries.
The sizes of Canadian domestic markets for durum wheat
and barley are much smaller than the U.S. domestic markets.
However, quantities of durum wheat and barley produced in
Canada are larger than those produced in the United States. 9
As a result, Canada has larger marketable surpluses of grain
and, therefore, is more dependent upon export markets than the
U.S. On average, Canada exports about 75 percent of its wheat
and 15 percent of its barley. Under CUSTA, the U.S. market
has become attractive to Canadian producers mainly because it
is the closest and single largest market to Canadian producing
regions.
In Canada, wheat and barley exports are marketed by the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). The CWB pays producers an in-
itial price when the grain is delivered and returns any revenue
surplus to producers as final payments. 10 In the United States,
grain is marketed by individual grain trading firms. U.S. wheat
and barley in the world market often compete with CWB grain.
8. See Record of Understanding Between the Governments of Canada and
the United States of America Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade (Dec. 2,
1998) <http://www.agr.ca/cb/trade>.
9. INTERNATIONAL GRAINS COUNCIL, WORTD GRAIN STATISTICS (1996/97).
10. Simonot, The Economics of State Trading in Wheat (1997) (M.S. The-
sis, University of Saskatchewan) (on file with author).
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The CWB controls grain exports to both offshore and U.S. mar-
kets through export licenses. It is perceived in the United
States that the CWB may distort trade flows. 1 Some constitu-
encies argue that it has monopsony power in purchasing agricul-
tural commodities from producers. At the same time, the CWB
is a single desk sales agency that has the exclusive right to make
marketing decisions regarding prices and quantities. Thus, it is
argued that the CWB is able to exercise price discrimination to
maximize profits in world markets. This is perceived to be an
unfair advantage of the CWB over private firms in the United
States. However, the WTO, under Article XVII:1, allows a state
trading enterprise to charge different prices between markets
provided it is done for commercial reasons based on market con-
ditions in export markets. In addition, it is argued that the
CWB does not provide sufficient information regarding its gen-
eral operation. This is especially true regarding purchase and
sales price information for agricultural commodities. Some ana-
lysts argue that these practices by the CWB represent an unfair
advantage over their U.S. competitors.1 2
The Canadian rail subsidy was an indirect subsidy provided
to farmers by the Canadian government under the Western
Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) for shipments of the desig-
nated grains from producing regions to export ports.1 3 U.S.
grain producers argued that, under the Act, Canadian grains
were more competitive in offshore markets. Canada, however,
eliminated the controversial rail subsidy under the WGTA in
1995. Contrary to the expectations of U.S. grain producers, the
elimination of the rail subsidies induced larger inflows of grains
into the United States. The elimination of the WGTA has ulti-
11. See generally MERLINDA INGCO AND FRANCIS NG, DISTORTIONARY EF-
FECTS OF STATE TRADING IN AGRICULTURE: ISSUES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION, 31-32 (Development Research Group, The
World Bank, Feb. 1998).
12. See TROY G. SCHMITZ AND WON W. Koo, AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL FEED AND MALTING BARLEY MARKETS: AN ECONOMETRIC SPATIAL
OLIGOPOLISTIC APPROACH (North Dakota State Univ. Agric. Econ. Report No.
357, 1996).
13. Canada enacted the Western Grain Transportation Act in 1983. Under
the WGTA, the Canadian government provided rail companies with annual
payment of up to C$658 million with adjustment for inflation to cover the trans-
portation costs of eligible grain shipments to selected shipping terminals at
western and eastern ports. Under this Act, shipping costs from Canadian
prairies to offshore markets were lower than the shipping costs from U.S. pro-
ducing regions to the same offshore markets. It is argued by U.S. grain produ-
cers that Canada enjoyed a comparative advantage over the U.S. in shipping
grains to these markets.
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mately made the U.S. market more attractive for Canadian pro-
ducers, because transportation costs from the Canadian prairies
to the United States are lower than those from the Canadian
prairies to most offshore markets. 14
The exchange rate between the two currencies also plays an
important role in bilateral trade of agricultural commodities and
products. Since the U.S. economy has been stronger than the
Canadian economy since 1985, the U.S. dollar has appreciated
against the Canadian dollar. The U.S. dollar appreciation makes
U.S. agricultural commodities more expensive in the Canadian
market and, at the same time, Canadian agricultural commodi-
ties less expensive in the U.S. market. 15
Another important contributing factor affecting trade flows
of grain between the two countries is differences in the quality of
grain produced in the countries. This is especially true for du-
rum wheat trade between the two countries. U.S. millers de-
mand high quality durum wheat. Whenever the United States
cannot produce enough high quality durum wheat (due to
weather conditions and diseases during the growing season) to
meet domestic demand, U.S. millers have imported high quality
durum wheat from Canada.
The U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) has also
played an important role in maintaining U.S. competitiveness of
wheat and barley exports in off-shore markets. 16 However, EEP
adversely affected the bilateral trade of the crops by raising the
U.S. domestic prices of the crops. Higher relative prices in the
14. See Demcey Johnson and William W. Wilson, Canadian Rail Subsidies
and Continental Barley Flows: A Spatial Analysis, 31 LOGISTIC AND TRANSPORT.
REV. 31-46 (1995) (predicting that removal of the rail subsidies will likely result
in increased shipments to the United States); WEINING MAO ET AL., WORLD
FEED BARLEY TRADE UNDER ALTERNATIVE TRADE POLICY SCENARIOS (North Da-
kota State Univ. Agric. Econ. Report No. 350, 1996).
15. For example, assume that Canadian wheat priced at C$5.00/bushel is
sold at $3.57/bushel in the U.S. market at an exchange rate of C$1.40/$1.00. If
the U.S. dollar appreciates from C$1.40 to C$1.50, the price of Canadian wheat
decreases from $3.57 to $3.33 in the U.S. market. On the other hand, U.S.
wheat priced at $3.57 will be C$4.90 in Canada at an exchange rate of C$1.40/
$1.00 and will be C$5.25 at an exchange rate of C$1.50/$1.00. An appreciation
in the value of the U.S. dollars against Canadian dollars, in the integrated U.
S.- Canadian grains market, makes Canadian grains export more attractive in
the U.S. market. There are numerous empirical studies confirmed this hypothe-
sis. See e.g., J.R. Coleman and Karl D. Meilke, The Influence of Exchange Rates
on Red Meat Trade Between Canada and the United States, 36 CANADIAN J. OF
AGRic. ECON. 401-424 (1988).
16. See Julian M. Alston et al., The Wheat War of 1994, 42 CANADIAN J. OF
AGRIC. ECON. 231-251 (1994); See also MAO, supra note 14, at 25; SCHMITZ,
supra note 12, at 5.
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U.S. market attracted flows of the crops from Canada. The U.S.
government has not used EEP since 1995 except for barley.' 7
II. TRADE BARRIERS OF GRAINS IN THE PRE- AND
POST-CUSTA ERA
Prior to the CUSTA/NAFTA, there were barriers (e.g., tar-
iffs and non-tariff barriers) in trading small grains (including
durum wheat) between the United States and Canada. Tariffs
imposed by the United States prior to 1989 were $7.70/ton for
wheat, $2.30/ton for malting barley, and $3.40/ton for other bar-
ley; and those imposed by Canada were C$4.40/ton for wheat
and C$2.30/ton for all barley. Under the CUSTA, tariffs on
wheat and barley were placed on a schedule of elimination in 10
equal segments and, therefore, were eliminated completely by
January 1, 1998. In Canada, imports of wheat from the U.S.
had been subject to import licenses, administered by the Cana-
dian Wheat Board,' 8 but these were removed immediately after
the CUSTA. In 1991, however, Canada instituted a legal regime
that American wheat destined for processing in Canada must be
accompanied by an end-use certificate (EUC), permitted under
CUSTA Article 705(1). Canadian processors importing Ameri-
can wheat must request the EUC from the Canadian Grain
Commission. Subsequently, the United States government also
instituted an end-use certificate (EUC) requirement for all Ca-
nadian wheat entering the U.S. effective February 27, 1995.19
III. ESTIMATED PRICES AND INCOME EFFECTS OF
INCREASED EXPORT SUPPLY FROM CANADA
In the post-CUSTA era, increased exports of wheat (includ-
ing durum wheat) from Canada into the U.S. market became a
major trade irritant, particularly in the Northern Plains states.
Producers in the Northern Plains states generally believe that
increased export supply of grains from Canada has resulted in
17. EEP was used for barley once in 1998 in response to a U.S. import of
EU barley.
18. This requirement allowed the CWB to operate the "two-price wheat pol-
icy". The CWB has an explicit policy to sell to domestic millers at a price equal
to or less than the landed price of equivalent U.S. grain. Interest groups in the
U.S. argues that as a result of CWB policy on wheat imports into Canada from
the U.S. have been limited to very small volumes, and restricted at times when
there is a shortage of specific qualities of Canadian wheat.
19. The use of EUCs on commodities requires only when Canada requires
them of American products. See North American Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §321(f), 107 Stat. 2111 (1993).
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the loss of potential income through price and income effects.
Economic theory, based on the law of supply and demand,
predicts that increased supply of a commodity lowers the price of
the commodity if demand for the commodity remains the same.
Increased supply of a commodity, ceteris paribus, reduces the
price of the commodity.
Industry econometric models for durum wheat and barley in
the United States were developed to evaluate this allegation
based on the relationship between the price and the quantity of
supply.20 In the model, the total supply is divided into domestic
supply and imports, mainly from Canada. The price and supply
relationship was estimated by using time series data. The sta-
tistical relationship between price and supply in the durum
wheat model is statistically significant, implying that the in-
creased domestic supply and imports of durum wheat in the
United States, ceteris paribus, lower the price of durum wheat.
The estimated price flexibility coefficients for import of du-
rum wheat is 0.24 at mean levels of price and quantity, indicat-
ing that the price of durum wheat decreases 2.4 percent when
the import volume increases by 10 percent. 2 1 The estimated
price flexibility coefficient for domestic supply is 0.76, which is
larger than that for imports. The difference in the magnitude of
price flexibility coefficients between imports and domestic sup-
ply is mainly because domestic and imported wheat are differen-
tiated in the U.S. domestic market. The domestic price of durum
wheat is more sensitive to domestic supply than imports from
Canada because durum wheat imported from Canada is of
higher quality.
The estimated price flexibility coefficient for domestic sup-
ply of barley is 0.41 and that for imports from Canada is 0.07,
indicating that domestic price of barley decreases by 4.1 percent
and 0.7 percent, respectively, when both domestic supply and
imports increase by 10 percent. The price flexibility coefficients
20. See WON W. Koo, BILATERAL TRADE OF DURuM WHEAT AND BARLEY
UNDER CUSTA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FARM PRICE AND INCOME (North Dakota
State Univ. Agric. Econ. Report No. 385, 1998).
21. Price flexibility coefficient is defined as a percentage change in price
resulting from a one percent changes in quantity of supply. It should be noted
that the estimated price effects of export supply of wheat and barley from Can-
ada are based on the estimated price flexibility coefficient, which is derived
from a partial equilibrium model. Market equilibrium conditions in North
American market are explicitly considered in the specification of the
econometric model, while the equilibrium conditions in other parts of the world
are assumed to be constant.
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indicate that domestic prices are more sensitive to Domestic
supply than imports.
When applying the estimated price flexibility coefficients to
the U.S. durum wheat industry, the U.S. domestic price of du-
rum wheat was estimated to be reduced by about 11 percent an-
nually for 1994-1996 period because of increased Canadian
durum wheat exports to the United States. Similarly, U.S. bar-
ley prices were estimated to be reduced by about 4.3 percent an-
nually because of increased Canadian barley exports to the
United States. The decreased prices of durum wheat and barley
led to reductions in farm income. The average farm income loss
is estimated to be $148 million/year for both U.S. durum wheat
and barley producers: $47 million/year for durum wheat produ-
cers and $101 million for barley producers (see Table 3).
Given uncertainties about the estimated income loss result-
ing from the increased Canadian exports into the U.S., upper
and lower bounds of the estimates of farm income loss are con-
sidered. In the upper bound scenario, 22 the average farm in-
come loss is estimated to be $192 million/year for both durum
wheat and barley producers: $64 million/year for durum wheat
producers and $128 million/year for barley producers. This re-
sulted from a 15.3 percent reduction in durum wheat price and a
7.6 percent reduction in barley price in the United States. In the
lower bound scenario23, average income loss is estimated to be
$104 million/year for both durum wheat and barley producers in
the United States: $31 million/year for durum wheat producers
and $73 million/year for barley producers. The estimated price
reduction under this scenario is 6.5 percent for durum wheat
and 1.3 percent for barley.24 These estimated income losses,
however, are not necessarily a loss to the U.S. economy. The
intermediate and/or end users of durum wheat and barley, for
22. Using the price flexibility coefficient calculated from the estimated pa-
rameters for the import variable of the model plus one standard error corre-
sponding with the variable. In this scenario, Price is about 50% more sensitive
to changes in quantity supplies than the base case. See Koo, supra note 21, at
11-21
23. Using the price flexibility coefficient calculated from the estimated pa-
rameters for the import variable of the model minus one standard error corre-
sponding with the variable. In this scenario Price is about 50 percent less
sensitive to changes in quantity supplies than the base case. See id.
24. It should be noted that the estimated magnitude of the impact of Cana-
dian export supply on prices and income in the U.S. may differ depending on the
scope and specification of the model (i.e., partial versus general equilibrium
analysis, time period considered, coverage of the world market, etc.).
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example, are beneficiaries of the lower prices of durum wheat
and barley arising the surge on Canadian exports.
IV. U.S. COUNTER MEASURES BY USING THE
U.S. TRADE STATUTES
The recent history of grain trade disputes between the two
countries reveals that U.S. wheat producers have attempted, us-
ing trade statutes and other means such as border blockades, to
stop or at least to reduce the flow of Canadian wheat and barley
into the U.S. market to minimize their income loss (see Table 4).
A number of U.S. trade statutes are available to protect domes-
tic producers of like goods from unfair trade practices by foreign
exporters, including anti-dumping duties 25 and countervailing
duties. 26 (Table 4). Although these two laws are aimed at differ-
ent forms of unfair trade, they have many procedural and sub-
stantive similarities. Dumping generally refers to a form of
international price discrimination, whereby goods are sold in
one export market at prices lower than the prices at which com-
parable goods are sold in the home market of the exporter, or in
its other export markets. 27 The purpose of the countervailing
duty law, on the other hand, is to offset any unfair competitive
advantage that foreign manufacturers (or exporters) might en-
joy over U.S. domestic producers as a result of subsidies.28
25. Title VII, Subtitle B of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4995 (1994).
26. Title VII, Subtitle A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4995 (1994).
27. Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides that an anti-
dumping duty shall be imposed, in addition to any other duty, if two conditions
are met. First, the Department of Commerce must determine that "a class or
kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the U.S. at less
than its fair value". Second, the USITC must determine that "an industry in the
U.S. is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the estab-
lishment of an industry in the U.S. is materially retarded, by reason of imports
of that merchandise." 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1999).
28. Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994, provides a countervailing duty shall be im-
posed, in addition to any other duty, equal to the amount of net countervailable
subsidy, if two conditions are met. First, the DOC must determine that a
countervailable subsidy is being provided, directly or indirectly, "with respect to
the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise im-
ported, or sold into the U.S." and must determine the amount of the net
countervailable subsidy. Second, the USITC must determine that "an industry
in the U.S. is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the
establishment of an industry in the U.S. is materially retarded, by reason of
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In addition to AD and CVD provisions, import relief (safe-
guard) under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended
by section 1401 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, and sections 301-304 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, sets forth the authority and procedures for the President to
take action, including import relief to facilitate efforts by a do-
mestic industry which has been seriously injured by imports to
make a positive adjustment to import competition."29
Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as
amended, also provides relief if imports "render or tend to
render ineffective, or materially interfere with" domestic farm
programs. 30 If interference is suspected, the President can or-
der an investigation by the International Trade Commission. 31
Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, also provides
that the USITC investigate and report to President and Con-
gress on the administrative, fiscal and industrial effects of the
customs laws of the United States. 32 Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 also provides the authority to respond to certain un-
fair foreign practices. 33
The first legal challenge to bilateral asymmetric wheat
trade flows in the post-CUSTA era was started in 1989 when
North Dakota durum wheat producers complained that the Ca-
nadian freight subsidies provided under the Western Grain
Transportation Act (WGTA) constituted an export subsidy, in vi-
olation of CUSTA Article 701.2. The United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) examined the allegation and concluded that
"subsidies under the WGTA would not appear to be classified as
export subsidies" since the freight subsidy under the WGTA ap-
plied to all shipments to Thunder Bay, whether destined for ex-
port or domestic use. Subsequently, the controversial WGTA
was eliminated by the Canadian government in 1995.
The second legal challenge was initiated on October 26,
1989 by the U.S. Congress, under the provisions of Section 332
imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales of that merchandise for im-
portation." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Title VII,
Subtitle A, § 701, 108 Stat. 4995 (1994).
29. STAFF OF HOUSE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 98-99 (Comm. Print
1997).
30. Id. at 616
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1066-68.
33. Id. at 80.
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of the Tariff Act of 1930. 34 In accordance with section 332(g) of
the Tariff Act,3 5 the USITC instituted investigation No. 332-
285, Durum Wheat: Conditions of Competition Between the U.S.
and Canadian Industries. The Senate Committee on Finance
requested that the Commission report the results of its investi-
gation by June 22, 1990. On that date, the Commission reported
the results of its investigation to the House Committee on Ways
and Means and Senate Committee on Finance. 36 The USITC re-
jected the U.S. wheat industry's allegation that the Canadian
Wheat Board (CWB) had been "dumping" durum wheat into the
U.S. market (i.e., selling below acquisition price).
Subsequently, based on complaints filed by grain producers
in North Dakota and Montana, the U.S. Congress requested that
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 3 7 conduct a study ana-
lyzing the responsiveness of durum prices to market forces. The
results of the GAO study, presented during a Congressional field
hearing in Bismarck, North Dakota, in December 1989, indi-
cated that prices of durum wheat for 16 years (1973-88) had gen-
erally followed the movement of market forces such as stocks-to-
use ratios (i.e., price level bears a strong inverse relationship to
stocks on hand at the end of the year).38 These were followed by
a bi-national panel hearing, held in 1992 pursuant to Article
701(3) of the CUSTA, which unanimously ruled that there was
no compelling evidence that the CWB was selling wheat below
acquisition cost into the U.S. market.
Having failed to reduce Canadian export supply of wheat
(including durum) into the U.S. market through the use of U.S.
trade statutes and CUSTA Articles, the U.S. wheat industry
pressured the Clinton Administration in 1993 to take further
legal action through the Executive Branch under the provisions
of Section 22, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). 39 As di-
34. On November 15, 1989, the USITC received a letter from the Commit-
tee on Finance, US Senate, containing an identical request.
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g) (1999).
36. See Durum Wheat: Conditions of Competition Between the U.S. and
Canadian Industries, USITC Pub. 2274, Inv. No. 332-285 (June 1990).
37. The US General Accounting Office undertook an audit of CWB pricing
practices. However, it is generally viewed in the U.S. that the GAO was not able
to complete the study mainly because the CWB refused to provide the informa-
tion required for this GAO's investigation.
38. Canadian exporters viewed these investigations as indirect investiga-
tion of dumping allegation.
39. The USITC received a letter from the President Clinton stating that he
had been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture, "that there is reason to be-
lieve that wheat, wheat flour, and semolina are being or a practically certain to
be imported into the U.S. under such conditions and in such quantities as to
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rected by the President, the Commission instituted investigation
No. 22-54, on November 17, 1993, under Section 22(a) of the
AAA.40
The USITC determined, by the majority rule, that wheat,
wheat flour, and semolina were being imported into the US.
under such conditions and in such quantities as to "materially
interfere" with USDA price support programs for wheat.41 The
Commission's report to the President 42 indicates that the Com-
mission had seriously considered five economic analyses, inter
alia, containing empirical evidence submitted by the partici-
pants of the investigation as well as the USITC staff.43 The
render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price sup-
port payment and production adjustment program for wheat conducted by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)."
40. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a) (1999).
41. Material interference is defined by the Commission in the past cases as
'more than slight interference but less than major interference. When deter-
mining whether material interference is occurring or would occur the Commis-
sion has examined factors such as: i) the available supply of imports, including
import levels, changes in import volumes, world production, and world stocks of
the imported products; (ii) pricing data, including the relationship between im-
port prices, U.S. prices, and the support price; (iii) information relating to do-
mestic supply and demand; (iv) data relating to the government programs,
including CCC outlays, CCC surpluses, and changes in the cost to the govern-
ment of running a program. Three Commissioners (i.e., Rohr, Newquist, and
Bragg) determined that the subject goods are imported into the U.S. under such
conditions and in such quantities as to materially interferewith the price sup-
port programs conducted by the USDA for wheat. However, three other Com-
missioners (including the Chairman Watson, Vice Chairman Nuzum, and
Commissioner Crawford) determined that (i) wheat, wheat flour, and semolina
are not being imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to
render, or tend to render, ineffective the USDA wheat program; and that (ii) the
evidence of the recent impact of increased wheat imports could support the
President finding either material interference or not material interference.
When the vote by the six commissioners is tied, it is considered an affirmative
determination.
42. See Wheat, Wheat Flour, and Semolina, USITC Pub. 2794, Inv. No. 22-
54 (June 1994).
43. During the investigation, the Commission has received four economic
submissions from parties to the proceeding. They are SAG (on behalf of the
CWB by Sumner, Alston, and Gray); LECG (the Law and Economic Consulting
Group); USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture); ADE (Abel, Draft and Earley
on behalf of the Millers National Federation, the National Pasta Association,
and the National Grade Trade Council, all users of grain). The most detailed is
the one submitted on behalf of the CWB by SAG. The SAG submission presents
a partial equilibrium simulation model of the world market consisting of the
U.S., Canada, and the "rest of the world". The SAG submission suggested that
Canadian wheat export supply have had very small effects on U.S. wheat prices
and on U.S. wheat program costs. The Commission's report indicated that the
SAG analysis contains an extensive discussion of the parameters underlying a
model of the effects of imports on a market. The Commission's report stated
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USITC report to the President, in fact, led to a negotiated settle-
ment for the 1994/95 crop year, which is known as the Wheat
Peace Agreement. 44 In response to the agreement, the U.S. do-
mestic price of durum wheat increased from $4.67/bushel in
1994 to $5.75/bushel in 1995, but dropped again to $3.95/bushel
in 1997.
V. CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH BORDER
BLOCKADES OR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS?
Despite long and exhaustive legal actions, the volume of Ca-
nadian exports into the U.S. has not significantly abated. Grain
producers in Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota have
waged an increasingly hostile war of words and actions against
Canadian grain. Producers in these states have engaged in
blockades of Canadian grains and livestock shipments to the
United States. For example, Governor Bill Janklow of South
Dakota announced his intention to inspect all trucks carrying
Canadian grain and livestock beginning on September 16, 1998.
Governors of North Dakota, Montana and Idaho followed suit
immediately. 45 These unilateral actions against Canadian agri-
cultural products were vigorously protested by Canadian
government.
On December 2, 1998, in the aftermath of a series of legal
actions, hostile words, and border blockades, the United States
and Canada announced a Record of Understanding on bilateral
agricultural trade that included the U.S.-Canada Action Plan to
strengthen and expand agricultural trade relations between the
two countries. 46 The various provisions of the Record of Under-
standing seek to ease the tension between the United States and
Canada in grain and livestock trades.
* The action plan is designed to improve access for U.S.
farmers to primary elevators in Western Canada, while preserv-
further that "on the basis of this discussion, parameters are chosen such that
the effects of Canadian wheat on the U.S. market are small." See id. at 11-80.
44. See generally Alston, supra note 16, at 231-251. The Agreement was
effective only one crop year from September 12, 1994 to September 11, 1995.
45. See Press Releases by Office of the Governors, State of South Dakota,
North Dakota, Montana, and Idaho on September 15-18, 1998, supra notes 6
and 7.
46. The Record of Understanding is the result of negotiations between the
United States and Canada on a number of trade issues in the fall of 1998. Many
of these issues fall into the category of technical barriers to trade for grains,
livestock and meats, and horticultural products. See Record of Understanding,
Annexes 6-9, supra note 8.
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ing the integrity of the Canadian grain quality control system.
In this regard, four grain companies have proposed a total of 27
elevators within 60 miles of the border to receive U.S. grains.
The program complements existing arrangements that facilitate
the direct movement of U.S. wheat and barley to Canadian feed-
lots, feed mills, and flour mills, effective as of January 1, 1999.
* Growers in the U.S. are able to ship wheat under a
"Master Phytosanitary Certificate" without the requirement to
have each individual shipments tested. Wheat must originate
from an approved grower in states eligible under the program
and at least one sample per grower, per crop, must be officially
tested and found free of Karnal bunt spores. The Master
Phytosanitary Certificate must additionally satisfy require-
ments for dwarf bunt and flag smut based on area freedom or
official testing as appropriate. The program was implemented
for both North Dakota and Montana as of January 1, 1999.
0 The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has developed an
alternative certification program that permits shipments of
wheat, barely, rye and/or triticale, excluding seed, to transit
through Canada based on a certificate of origin in lieu of a
phytosanitary certificate with mandatory sampling and testing.
This allows U.S. grain to be shipped on the Canadian rail sys-
tem to final destinations in the United States beginning Janu-
ary 1, 1999 for producers from Montana, Minnesota, and North
Dakota.
0 Other grain related measures include phased in changes
in phytosanitary regulations for grain shipments to Canada and
efforts to harmonize pesticide regulations. In addition, Canada
and the United States agreed to meet quarterly, or more fre-
quently on request, to consult on global grain production and
marketing in order to strengthen cooperation and trust on issues
of mutual interest.
Although this U.S.- Canada action plan has provided oppor-
tunities for U.S. growers to ship their grains to Canada and to
use the Canadian rail system to ship grain to destinations in the
United States, the plan did not fully satisfy grain producers in
the United States because the major issue is not U.S. access to
the Canadian market. Grain producers' major concerns are rap-
idly increasing volumes of Canadian exports of wheat and barley
into the United States and their impacts on grain prices and
farm incomes, particularly in the Northern Plains region. For
grain producers in the U.S., the problem persists.
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More recently, the North Dakota Farmers Union proposed a
marketing pool for durum and hard red spring wheat outside the
purview of the Record of Understanding. The main purpose of
the marketing pool would be to enhance net farm income for
wheat producers in spring wheat producing regions. A feasibil-
ity study for the wheat pooling scheme concluded that a durum
wheat pool would provide additional revenue to durum wheat
producers by raising the U.S. domestic prices jointly with the
CWB in the North American Market. However, a hard red
spring wheat pool does not appear economically feasible mainly
because of close substitution with other wheat types.47 Others
have doubted the long-term viability of the wheat pool given its
potential to conflict with the liberalization trend in agricultural
markets started during the Uruguay Round of global trade
talks.48
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There have been several trade disputes over agricultural
commodities during the post-CUSTA era. Even though Cana-
dian exports of wheat and barley are not found to have violated
U.S. trade remedy laws, friction seems likely to continue as long
as the surge in Canadian export supply is unabated and na-
tional differences persist in grain marketing and delivery sys-
tems, farm subsidy programs, and trade policies. The geo-
political economy (i.e., dynamic interface of NAFTA, trade rem-
edy laws, and regional interest groups' welfare and politics) in
the U.S. would likely lead to further conflicts along the U.S. -
Canada border. Gradual harmonization of trade policies, farm
subsidy programs, and marketing institutions may reduce fur-
ther trade disputes between the two countries in the future. To
diffuse the threat of future trade disputes stemming from either
a pursuit of self-interest among parties or misunderstandings
about the nature of grain trade flows between the two countries,
a Canada - U.S. joint research team should be formed on the
subject matter. The research team should investigate the
causes of changed trade flows in the context of world market
perspectives and find workable and realistic conflict resolutions.
47. See WON W. Koo ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED NORTH
DAKOTA WHEAT POOL (North Dakota State Univ. Agric. Econ. Report No. 410,
1999).
48. See generally Jon Lauck, Against the Grain: The North Dakota Wheat
Pooling Plan and the Liberalization Trend in World Agricultural Markets, 8
MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 289 (1999).
118 [Vol. 9:103
U.S. -CANADIN GRAIN DISpUTES
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES, 1996
United States Canada Mexico
Population (million) 266.6 30.0 96.6
Per Capita GDP (1000 US$) $28.6 $19.4 $3.4
Population in Agriculture (%) 2.5 1.6 27.0
Land (million acres) 465.0 122.0 57.3
Per Capita Land (acres) 1.7 4.1 0.6
Average age (years) 32.0 32.8 22.0
Education (years in school) 11.0 12.0 7.5
Source: International Financial Statistics.
TABLE 2. BILATERAL TRADE OF THE SELECTED
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average
million bushels
U.S. Imports from Canada
HRS 8.0 15.8 35.3 65.7 51.4 30.0 53.0 56.7 36.4
Durum 15.4 16.4 15.7 20.6 12.3 8.4 13.7 19.1 13.8
Barley 9.9 18.6 20.2 26.4 89.2 62.2 48.1 45.4 29.4
U.S. Exports to Canada
HRS 0.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4
Durum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Barley 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
TABLE 3. DECREASES IN NET FARM INCOME FOR
DURUM WHEAT AND BARLEY PRODUCERS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1994-1996
Year Base High Price Effect Low Price Effect
million $
Wheat
1994 55.1 72.6 38.5
1995 42.4 57.6 28.2
1996 44.1 62.8 26.5
Average 47.2 64.3 31.1
Barley
1994 100.2 127.6 72.7
1995 95.5 121.3 69.7
1996 106.3 135.3 77.3
Average 100.7 128.1 73.3
Source: Agricultural Economics Report 385, Department of Agricultural
Economics, North Dakota State University.
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